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Abstract—Facing the increasing energy demands associated
with the perspective of fifth generation (5G) wireless networks,
the Mobile Network Operators (MNOs) are motivated to grad-
ually convert their traditional Radio Access Network (RAN)
infrastructure to more flexible and power efficient centralized
architectures, i.e., Cloud-RAN (C-RAN). Apart from their promis-
ing benefits in terms of management and network optimization,
these new architectures further enable the sharing of spectrum
and network elements, such as the Remote Radio Heads (RRHs)
and the Baseband Units (BBUs), among multiple operators. In
this paper, we introduce a novel scheme based on coalitional
game theory to identify the potential room for cooperation among
different MNOs that provide service to the same area. The
proposed scheme sets the rules for profitable collaboration and
identifies the core formation conditions (i.e., pricing) for various
scenarios with different market and spectrum shares among
three operators. Our results show that i) cooperation among sub-
coalitions of MNOs is always beneficial, yielding both higher
revenues and enhanced Quality of Service (QoS) for the end
users, and ii) the cooperation of all operators (grand coalition)
is profitable for given user pricing in different scenarios.
Index Terms—Cloud-RAN, Infrastructure Sharing, Spectrum
Sharing, Cooperative Games, Coalitions, Core, Pricing, HetNet.
I. INTRODUCTION
Global mobile data traffic will grow up by a factor of eight
between 2015 and 2020 [1], due to the increasing number of
smart devices (smartphones, tablets, PC, M2M devices) and
to the traffic volume they typically generate according to the
widespread diffusion of bandwidth-greedy applications. It is
estimated that by 2020 the 98% of mobile data traffic will
originate from smart devices and only mobile video traffic by
itself will represent the 75% of total mobile data traffic. Also,
the average downstream cellular connection speed (considering
all devices) will grow from 2.0 Mbps in 2015 to nearly 6.5
Mbps by 2020.
In order to follow these trends, Heterogeneous Networks
(HetNets) have been widely deployed in order to improve
the spatial utilization of the frequency resource. In 2015 the
51% of total mobile data traffic was offloaded onto Wi-Fi
and small-cell (SC) networks. In conclusion Next-generation
cellular networks (such as the fifth generation 5G network)
should support very dense high speed connections.
On the other hand, Base stations (BS) are the most expensive
component of traditional distributed RAN [2], where the
Operating Expenditure (OPEX) represents the 60% of the
Total Cost of Ownership. Also, according to [3], the Baseband
(BB) processing is the most power consuming element of SCs,
due to the high processing complexity required compared to
the low power transmitted. Thus, SCs densification is translated
into an increase in costs and CO2 emissions and, in order for
5G networks to be sustainable, it is fundamental to optimize
the energy-efficiency.
Many works addressed power consumption minimization
for traditional RAN, mainly leveraging BS switching-off
concepts [4]. The main drawback of switching-off in traditional
RAN are the possible coverage holes, because of the disjoint
BSs’ service areas.
Cloud-RAN is a centralized RAN architecture proposed
for an efficient usage of RAN resources [5], which has been
widely tested and adopted already by hardware manufacturers
and MNOs. Each BS is substituted with a RRH responsible
for analog RF functions, a BBU which performs digital BB
processing and a fronthaul (FH) link connecting RRH and
BBU. BBUs of different RRHs are grouped in a pool (BBU-
pool) which allows joint and dynamic coordination of the BB
processing in a real-time adaptable manner to current network
state. Manifold are its applications, among the others, user
equipment (UE) association, resource allocation, interference
management (e.g. CoMP) and power minimization.
In order to minimize the dominant BB power consumption,
the substitution of dedicated hardware BBUs with general pur-
pose processors (GPP) servers [6] has been recently proposed.
BB functionalities are implemented according to a virtualized
multi-standard approach, as instances of a virtual machine
(VM) running on the GPP-BBU. The one-to-one association
between BBUs and RRHs is replaced by a more flexible one-
to-many association [7]–[9], where BB resources of one BBU
can be used for more RRHs at the same time. Hence, in a
low loaded region RRHs can be served by a smaller set of
GPP-BBUs without performance losses. The network becomes
scalable and the overall power consumption can be minimized.
In conclusion C-RAN dense HetNet represents a candidate
architecture for providing high rates in a cost efficient way.
Many papers have addressed the NP-hard problem of
efficiently mapping BBUs and RRHs while guaranteeing some
objectives (e.g. power consumption minimization). Among the
possible strategies, [8] models the problem as a bin-packing
problem, [9] by using graph coloring, [10] as a Knapsack
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Fig. 1: System Model
problem, while [11] uses a listing algorithm.
In the literature, it is common opinion that SC offloading by
itself will not be sufficient for enabling the forecasted traffic
and that mmWave bandwidth extension will be necessary. On
the other hand, many works provide strategies for improving
the spectrum utilization efficiency by means of opportunistic
(Cognitive Radio) or cooperative spectrum sharing.
Many papers have addressed the problem of cooperation
among operators in case of traditional RAN. [12] studied
the benefits of jointly deploying a new shared network,
[13] investigated by means of non-cooperative game theory
the feasible infrastructure sharing advantages thanks to base
stations switching-off. On the other hand, works concerned
with C-RAN are mainly focused on the BBU optimization
in single operator case [8], [10], [11]. [9] considers the two
operators case but with separate spectrum licenses.
In this work, we propose a novel scheme for studying the
conditions for beneficial C-RAN sharing among coexisting
MNOs. The objective is evaluating how QoS and profits can
be improved thanks to a better spectrum utilization efficiency.
The problem is modeled as a coalitional game and investigated
for the three MNOs case, when different combinations of
market and spectrum share are associated with each MNO. Our
results demonstrate that cooperation is always advantageous
and, depending on the user pricing adopted, the grand coalition
can be preferred to smaller coalitions.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section II
presents the system model. In Section III the sharing problem
formulation and the proposed fair solution are introduced. In
Section IV, the conditions for the stability of the sub and grand
coalition are evaluated together with the gains provided by the
proposed solution. Finally, Section V concludes the paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
In this section, we introduce the system model taking Fig. 1
as a reference and we provide the state-of-the-art power model
for its main elements.
We consider a set M of mobile MNOs that deployed their
own 4G HetNet in a given area A. For each MNO m the
HetNet consists of a typical RAN macro cell (MC) layer and a
C-RAN SC layer. The two layers are separate in the frequency
domain and each MNO owns an exclusive spectrum license
for a band of Bm MHz reserved for SCs. Hence interference
is considered only between equipment belonging to the same
layer of the same MNO. We consider a unitary frequency
reuse factor for SCs. Each operator m has deployed Hm RRHs
uniformly distributed, which, according to Fig. 1, are connected
to Um GPP BBUs through a FH link. BBUs are grouped in a
centralized physical site named BBU-hotel. We assume that the
BBU-hotel is co-located with the MC eNodeB and connected
to the core network (CN) through the eNodeB. We assume
that MNOs share eNodeB and BBU-hotel site.
In the same area, are present NUE UE uniformly distributed
with activity factor fa, which represents the probability of
being active at a given time. Each MNO m has an exclusive
market share µm over the total number of UE. We assume best
SNR (Signal-to-Noise Ration) association, hence a specific
UE will associate to the eNodeB or RRH with the highest
received power above sensitivity SNRmin. At the end of
the association process, on average a portion of NUE will
associate to the eNodeB while a given percentage OSC will be
offloaded to the SC layer. Also we assume proportional-fairness
as scheduling strategy, thus each of the UE associated to a
particular eNodeB/RRH gets an equal amount of resources.
For each operator m, given Bm and µm, the number of
the deployed RRH is constrained by a minimum guaranteed
DL data rate Rmin for the SC layer. As well a minimum SC-
offloading factor OSCmin is set, as we assume higher data rates
for the SC layer.
A. Power Model
According to the power model provided by the EARTH
project [3], [14], RAN power consumption can be divided
into a term related to RRHs and the other to the BBU-pool:
Pm = P
h
m+P
u
m. In both terms the power consumed is provided
as a function of the Physical Resource Blocks (PRB) used
PRBusm,n in RRH n of MNO m out of the available ones
PRBm in the bandwidth Bm. PRB
us
m,n represents the total
load of a generic RRH n and can be expressed as the sum of the
PRBs needed for PHY layer overhead (control and signaling)
and UE transmission PRBusm,n = PRB
ov
m + PRB
UE
m,n. We
assume constant and equal overhead for the RRHs and we
define it as a percentage ✓ov of the total number of PRBs:
PRBovm = d✓ovPRBme.
1) RRH power model: For the power consumption of a
generic RRH n, we have adopted the EARTH model for the
C-RAN architecture:
Phm,n =
P TXPRBusm,n/⌘PA +NaP
RFPRBm
(1   DC) (1   m) (1)
where P TX is the RF output power over one PRB assuming that
no power adaptation is performed. ⌘PA is the power amplifier
efficiency, Na is the number of antennas, P
RF is the power
consumption of the RF transceiver for one PRB and  DC,  m
are the loss coefficients due to DC-DC power supply and mains
supply. For each RRH we assume P RF linearly scalable with
the number of carriers. Hence, the linear model of (1) can be
rewritten as:
Phm,n = P
h,ov
m + 
h
pPRB
UE
m,n (2)
Where  hp = P
TX/[⌘PA (1   DC) (1   m)] and Ph,ovm is
the RRH power consumption component due to PHY layer
overhead. Ph,ovm can be calculated by substituting PRB
us
m,n =
PRBovm in (1). Since we assume equal overhead in the
RRHs, we don’t use the subscript n. In conclusion the
total power consumed by all the RRHs in the network is
Phm =
PHm
n=1 P
h
m,n.
32) BBU power model: As introduced in Section I we
assume that BBUs are deployed by using identical x86 GPP
servers with equal processing capacity Xcap expressed in Giga
Operations Per Second (GOPS). Each BBU server is able
to instantiate multiple RRHs functionalities in the form of
VMs, which are soft resources that can be migrated among
BBUs and shared among RRHs. We consider uniform workload
share among the servers and we model with a constant KTX
the necessary computation for one PRB, when a specific
transmission configuration is used [14].
Given that in the worst-case of saturated RRHs (fa = 1)
the number of deployed BBUs Um has to be sufficient for
supporting the BB operations of the RRHs in the area, we
define Um = d(KTXHmPRBm) /Xcape. In average load case,
only some of the available BBUs need to be active Uactm for
supporting the total network load, while the remaining U idm =
Um Uactm are considered idle and can go into sleep mode for
energy consumption optimization. As already mentioned, one
possible way of calculating the optimum BBU-RRH mapping
is by solving a Knapsack problem [10]. In this context we
consider the ideal minimum number of active BBUs defined,
similarly to Um, as U
act
m = d
⇣
KTX
PHm
n=1 PRB
us
m,n
⌘
/Xcape.
We model the BBU power consumption as a function of the
total network load
PHm
n=1 PRB
UE
m,n [14] and we add a power
component Puid which accounts for idle-state BBUs (cooling,
power supply, etc. [7], [8]). The power consumption of the
whole BBU-pool can be expressed as:
(3)Pum = U
act
m P
u
st + U
id
mP
u
id +HmP
u,ov
m + 
u
p
HmX
n=1
PRBUEm,n
where Pust is the component due to those functions independent
from the network load (e.g. FFT and IFFT [5]),  up is the power
consumed per PRB when a specific transmission configuration
and server kind are used and Pu,ovm =  
u
pPRB
ov
m is the
consumption due to overhead processing of one RRH.
3) Total power consumed: With some arithmetics over (2)
and (3) and by defining P ovm = P
h,ov
m + P
u,ov
m and  p =
 hp + 
u
p , Pm can be rewritten as:
(4)Pm = U
act
m P
u
st + U
id
mP
u
id +HmP
ov
m + p
HmX
n=1
PRBUEm,n
III. COOPERATIVE GAME
In this section, we define the cooperative game approach
for the assessment of MNOs incentives for running a shared
SC C-RAN. Given the set of MNOs M, we assume that each
operator may decide to keep running its network independently
or to cooperate by creating a coalition ! where the SC layers
are pooled together. In other words, the MNOs agree on sharing
RRHs, BBUs, FH and SCs’ spectrum and each member of
the coalition has the same rights of using infrastructure and
resources. By cooperating operators provide their UE with
higher rates and an extended coverage, which are translated in
increased revenues. On the other hand, by sharing the costs
of a larger network we expect that forming a coalition will
be profitable only under given conditions and depending on
the particular market and spectrum share of the cooperating
MNOs. To this end, we formulate the problem as a coalitional
game where MNOs are the players and we investigate which
are these conditions and which is their physical meaning.
A. Architecture Adaptation for Cooperation
In order to make effective the spectrum pooling, some
architectural adaptations are needed. First of all RRHs are
modified for supporting multiple carriers and LTE-A compliant
UE will be able to access the extended band according to Carrier
Aggregation (CA) technique. In addition by assuming 3GPP
MOCN (multi-operator core network) compliant RRHs, multi-
tenant traffic can be to sustained in a transparent way. Since we
assumed in Section II that MNOs are already sharing the BBU-
hotel, BBUs can be pooled by deploying a common switch and
by implementing a central shared coordinator (Fig. 1). The latter
is responsible for RRHs’ state monitoring and for performing
the joint BBU optimization, while respecting objectives and
traffic profiles of different MNOs. This architecture is consistent
with the architectures defined in [15], [16] for extending the
Software Defined Networks (SDN) concepts to RAN.
As we already stated in Section I we only investigate the
costs due to OPEX and thus we consider the expenses for the
architecture adaptation as exceptional costs out of this context.
B. Coalitional Game
For the general cooperative game (M, V ), we represent with
⌦ the set of all the 2M\; possible coalitions and with V! the
coalition payoff, which can be considered as the maximum
utility value that the set of players in coalition ! can jointly
obtain. Let vm be the portion of V! assigned to player m when
participating to that coalition, named player’s payoff, then a
payoff allocation v 2 R! is the vector representing a possible
distribution of the payoffs among the players in coalition !.
The core C is the set of payoff allocations such that no group
of players is willing to leave the grand coalition for one of the
sub-coalitions.
Coalitional games are a specific class of cooperative
games [17], which address those problems where forming
coalitions is preferred by the players. A particular class of
coalitional games are the canonical ones where joining the
grand coalition M represents the most convenient choice. This
means that the payoff that player m receives out of VM is
at least as large as the payoff it would receive in any of the
disjoint sets of sub-coalitions ⌦\M. In this terms, the core C
guarantees the stability of the grand coalition as the players
don’t have incentives for leaving it.
Expressing the payoff allocation in the grand coalition with
v 2 VM and the one for a subcoalition with y 2 V! , a possible
definition of the core is [17]:
C = {v 2 VM | 8!, @y 2 V!, s.t. ym > vm, 8m 2 !} (5)
The core C doesn’t always exist and in those cases the grand
coalition is considered unstable.
Our objective is to determine under which conditions the
problem of cooperation between MNOs for sharing SC C-RAN
resources can be considered as a canonical coalitional game, or
in other terms when the grand coalition of MNOs is preferred
to the sub-coalitions and when the opposite is true.
4We model MNOs payoff in ! as their profit [12], defined
as the difference between revenues ⇢m and costs Cm, when
m 2 !. We assume that the revenue of each MNO only depends
on its own UEs and will not be shared with other MNOs. On
the other hand, operators share the total C-RAN costs C! and
c 2 R! is the cost sharing vector which tells us the portion of it
that each MNO is willing to pay (
P
m2! cm = 1, 0  cm  1).
The payoff of MNO m according to c is:
vm = ⇢m   Cm = ⇢m   cmC!, m 2 ! (6)
Thus, the value of the generic coalition ! can be defined as
the sum of its members’ profit:
V! =
X
m2!
vm =
X
m2!
⇢m   C! (7)
This particular definition applies to non transferable utility
(NTU) coalitional games [17], where each MNO’s payoff
depends on the joint actions of the other MNOs in that coalition.
Indeed being revenues independent for each MNOs, they all
need to agree on the cost sharing vector c. The core definition
provided in (5) is valid for NTU games.
When C exists, among all the possible cost shares c 2 RM,
we choose the market share vector µ 2 RM as unique and fair
solution. This means that each operator will pay a portion of
the coalition cost proportional to the number of UEs it owns, as
it is a rough but logical estimation of its load contribution into
the shared C-RAN (see (4)). In other words, cm = µm/µ!,
where µ! =
P
m2! µm is the market share of coalition !.
We proceed now to the specific definition of revenues and
costs for the system model defined in Section II.
C. Revenue Model
We model the revenue ⇢m as a price proportional to the
minimum rate Rg guaranteed to the UE when MNO m
participates to coalition !. Thus, the operator charges a flat
tariff ⌧r per unit of data rate per month [e/Mbps/month] [12].
Considering an investment period of T years, the revenue of
MNO m over this period can be defined as below:
⇢m = 12T ⌧r Rg µmNUE (8)
D. Cost Model
By focusing on OPEX, the cost model reduces to the
power consumption P! of coalition ! multiplied by a constant
 p[e/W/year], which represents the price per unit of power
consumed in the investment period T [Y ears]. Considering
average power consumption P! over T , the total cost function
C! of coalition ! is:
C! = T  p P! (9)
where ⇢KWh[e/KWh] is the realistic tariff set by energy
providers and  p[e/W/year] = ⇢KWH · 10 3 · 365 · 24 is
the tariff adapted to Watts for the reference period of one
year. Finally, P! is calculated as in (4), after substituting
m with !, and taking into account that operators agree
on pooling together their C-RAN elements as explained in
Section III-A. Hence, the aggregated BW B! =
P
m2! Bm
and the total number of PRB in a coalition can be represented
as PRB! =
P
m2! PRBm, while the total numbers of RRHs
and BBUs in coalition ! become H! =
P
m2!Hm and
U! = d(H!PRB!KTX) /Xcape.
TABLE I: Scenarios
Scenario A Scenario B
m 1 2 3 1 2 3
Bm[MHz] 20 20 20 5 15 20
µm 1/3 1/3 1/3 0.1 0.3 0.6
Hm 247 193 200 247 234 214
Um 156 125 130 40 76 139
TABLE II: System Parameters
Cooperative Game
Parameters Values Parameters Values
NUE 20000 [12] T [Y ears] 1
A[Km2] 4 [12] ⇢KWH[e/KWh] 0.121
m 2M {1, 2, 3} OSCmin 80%
⌦ 2
M\; Rmin[Mbps] 0.782
⌧r[
e/Mbps
month ] [0.1, 0.92]
PHY Layer Femto Cell RRH [3]
Parameters Values Parameters Values
hSC[m] 10 P
TX
[mW ] 1
hUE[m] 1.5 ⌘PA 4.4%
SNRmin[dB]  4 P RF[mW ] 12
gH , gUE[dBi] 0 [3]  DC 9%
 shad[dB] 5 [10]  m 11%
Nt[dBm/Hz]  174 [10] Intel Xeon E5540 BBU [14]
NF [dB] 5 Parameters Values
Na 2x2 [3] Xcap[GFLOPS] 324
Path loss 3GPP LTE model KTX 2.0978
UE, RRH uniform distribution Puid[W ] 3 [7]
✓ov 30% P
u
st[W ] 120
fa 0.16 [3]  
u
p 0.6125
IV. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
We have implemented a custom simulator in Matlab to
evaluate the revenue and costs of the MNOs under different
coalitions and to determine the existence of the core. In the
following sections, we define the network setup and the results
of our experiments.
A. Simulation Set Up
We consider a network as depicted in Fig. 1, where three
operators have deployed their networks in an area of 4Km2.
We assume that there are NUE = 20000 users in this specific
area and we consider two different scenarios (Table I):
• Scenario A: The operators have equal market share and
bandwidth capabilities.
• Scenario B: The operators have different market share and
bandwidth capabilities proportional to their market share.
In both cases, the MNOs have deployed their network in order
to satisfy the constraints on OSCmin and Rmin. The number
Hm of RRHs for each operator is calculated in the worst-
case scenario where fa = 1 and the guaranteed rate is Rg
(on average fa < 1 and the offered data rate Roff is greater
than the rate charged Rg). The number of RRHs Hm and of
BBUs Um are provided in Table I, while the remaining system
parameters are summarized in Table II.
B. Performance Results
In Fig. 2, the average offered UE rate Roff versus the
offloading factor OSCmin is presented for Scenario B, in order
to study the benefits of cooperation among MNOs. As we may
1http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php.
2Typical rate for 4G video streaming, killer application (see Section I).
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Fig. 2: Scenario B: Offered data rate vs SC offloading factor
see, in stand-alone scenarios, both the offloading factor and
data rate are quite low but always above OSCmin and Rmin. By
forming coalitions of two, the MNOs may significantly improve
their offloading potential and offered rate, while the grand
coalition (cooperation among all three operators) provides the
highest rate of all scenarios and a very high offloading factor.
This can be explained taking into account that by pooling
the network elements (i.e., RRHs and BBUs) and aggregating
the bandwidth, we manage to fully exploit the aggregated
resources and optimize the spectrum usage. Please note that
by cooperating and without mmWave bandwidth extension,
the offered average rate is always greater than the average 6.5
Mbps estimated for 2020 (see Section I).
In continuation, in Fig. 3, we plot the profit V! for all
possible stable coalitions (applying (7) when the core is
nonempty). For Scenario A, MNOs have similar profits when
operating individually, since they all have same market share
and spectrum. On the other hand, in Scenario B, the MNO with
highest market share (i.e., MNO3) also has higher profits.
We can clearly observe that, in both scenarios, any pair of
MNOs always forms a stable sub-coalition, meaning that for
their members it is always preferable cooperating rather than
working individually. This can be explained by the fact that,
when forming a coalition, the spatial optimization of the pooled
resources and the enhanced spectrum usage enable better QoS,
thus increasing MNOs’ revenues. On the other hand, the total
cost for pooling is distributed according to operator’s market
share and the cost of the involved MNOs remains approximately
unchanged. In conclusion, by participating in a sub-coalition,
MNOs’ profit increases. However, not all sub-coalitions offer
the same profit to their members. This can be observed in
Scenario B, where sub-coalitions involving the largest operator
(i.e., MNO3) achieve higher aggregate profits.
As far as the grand coalition is concerned, it can be seen
that it can always provide significantly higher profits than any
subcoalition, for both scenarios. However, it becomes stable
(i.e., the core exists) only when a minimum tariff ⌧r is reached.
This is mainly due to the incremental costs associated with
spectrum pooling, which represents the price to pay for a better
spatial spectrum usage. Indeed the size of the BBU-pool U! and
the power consumed for control and signalling depend on the
total BW (see Section II-A). In the case of sub-coalitions, this
term can be approximated with that of individual operation,
since the bandwidth increase is relatively small. Therefore,
its impact on the total cost is negligible. However, when all
resources are pooled to form the grand coalition, the aggregated
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Fig. 3: Coalitions payoffs in stable conditions (T = 1)
BW increases significantly, and this term becomes dominant.
Hence, tariffs must be set above a given minimum value, in
order to ensure that the obtained revenues will payback the
increased OPEX, leading to a stable grand coalition.
By comparing the two scenarios, we notice that the minimum
tariff required in Scenario A (⌧r = 0.23) is much smaller with
respect to Scenario B (⌧r = 0.62). Indeed, as we show below,
for low values of ⌧r, the core coincides with the market share
which operators are forced to adopt as the sole stable payoff
distribution. Thus, for Scenario A, the three equal sized MNOs
have the same incentive for joining the grand coalition when
the tariff compensates for the increased costs. In Scenario B,
the market share is unbalanced, and as a result, MNO3 with
the highest market share must assume the greater portion of the
costs. For that reason, when the tariff is very low,MNO3 better
prefers forming sub-coalitions, where, as explained before, the
operational cost is not noticeably affected.
Overall, some useful insights can be gained:
• Cooperation is always beneficial for MNOs, even when the
tariffs are low.
• The profits that can be obtained in each particular coalition
depend on the QoS guarantees offered to the end users (i.e.,
the Rg), represented by the slopes of the profit curves. Hence,
the achieved QoS and the selected tariff represent the criteria
for MNOs in order to choose partners for cooperation.
• MNOs have a higher profit margin when cooperating with
equal-sized operators. As seen in the case of Scenario A, the
cooperation of MNOs with equal market share and bandwidth
can yield higher profits with much lower tariffs, which is an
appealing solution for both MNOs and end users.
Figure 4 represents the cost allocations cm for each MNOm,
with the allocations c1 and c2 represented in the x and y
axis, respectively, and c3 derived as c3 = 1   c1   c2. For
each scenario, three tariff values are considered, starting from
the minimum value that supports the formation of a stable
grand coalition (i.e., the existence of the core). The grey areas
represent the allocations within the core, whereas the white star
represent the point for which the cost allocations coincide with
the market share. As mentioned before, we can observe that the
market share always belongs to the core. In Scenario A, where
all MNOs have equal market shares, the core is symmetrical,
whereas in Scenario B, the core moves towards the low-left
corner, as the major part of the cost is assigned to MNO3
(which holds the largest market share). Furthermore, for similar
tariffs, the core dimension is much higher in Scenario A, due
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Fig. 4: Grand Coalition Cost Share
to the steeper slopes of the profit curves (see Fig. 3).
Another important observation is that for very small tariffs,
the market share is the only solution acceptable to the MNOs
(i.e., the MNOs only wish to pay proportionally to the UEs
they own). On the other hand, by increasing the tariff, other
payoff distributions become feasible as the core expands,
and the MNOs may reach different business agreements on
how to share the cost, while maintaining a high profit. For
example, as an extreme case, in Scenario A and for ⌧r = 0.41,
two MNOs could afford to pay for the whole C-RAN cost,
letting the third MNO operating with zero cost. In Scenario
B, such configuration could be possible for a higher tariff
(⌧r = 0.82), where the smallest MNO (i.e., MNO1) may
receive a null cost allocation. Such agreement could be justified
by considering that, in this scenario, MNO1 has a very small
market share with negligible impact on the total network cost.
However, MNO1’s contribution to the pool of resources has
a positive effect on the other operators, leading to increased
QoS provisioning for all the members of the grand coalition.
Finally we estimate the gains obtained by the MNOs
when a grand coalition is formed and the cost allocation
is based on the market share. The gain is calculated as:
Gm = 100
⇥ 
VM   V{m}
 
/V{m}
⇤
%.
In Scenario A, for tariff values ⌧r = {0.23, 0.32, 0.41}
the gain is equal for all MNOs Gm = {330, 320, 289}%. In
Scenario B, when the tariff values are ⌧r = {0.62, 0.71, 0.83}
we get for MNO1 G1 = {98, 98, 98}%, for MNO2 G2 =
{192, 191, 189}% and for MNO3 G3 = {303, 295, 288}%.
It is clearly shown that the gains in joining the stable grand
coalition are enormous, ranging always above 98% for both
scenarios and for different tariff values. In Scenario B, we can
observe that for a given tariff, the gain increases according
to the MNOs market and spectrum share, because a bigger
number of users pays for the increased QoS, while a smaller
incremental cost is payed due to spectrum pooling. The last
remark is that in both scenarios and for all MNOs, the gains
decrease as the tariff increases. Indeed the real advantage in
cooperating comes when the MNOs struggle for having a
positive profit by their own, which happens when the tariff is
low and the revenues are very close to the costs.
V. CONCLUSION
In this work, we have proposed a novel scheme defined
according to coalitional game theory for the assessment of
cooperation incentives when MNO coexist in the same area.
Different scenarios are considered for different market and
spectrum shares in the three operators case. The users QoS
improvement is highlighted in terms of offered data rate as
well as the profit gains for the operators. The minimum user
pricing schemes are obtained for the stability of sub and grand
coalitions. We proved that for the operators it is always more
convenient collaborating, with profit gains ranging above 98%
when compared to the stand-alone case. We also found for the
different scenarios the minimum pricing for considering the
grand coalition as the most advantageous option. In our future
work, we plan to extend the results to the N-operators case.
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